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Abstract
The first ENTraNCE Annual Conference was held on 14-15 
October 2016, with the aim of discussing the most recent 
developments, both in the US and in the EU, while estimating 
the degree of convergence between the two main antitrust 
jurisdictions. 
The event was divided into four panels, which dealt, 
respectively, with (i) recent developments in relation to the 
assessment of horizontal and vertical agreements in online 
markets; (ii) merger trends in innovation markets on the two 
sides of the Atlantic; (iii) antitrust enforcement in innovation 
industries: Google and the SEP cases, on both sides of the 
Atlantic; (iv) private enforcement in the EU and the US in 
the aftermath of the EU Damages Directive. 
The Annual Conference gathered different stakeholders 
together, including representatives from National 
Competition Authorities (NCAs), international 
organisations, academia, industry, and law and consulting 
firms. The diversity of views ensured a lively debate. While 
participants agreed on various issues, the discussion revealed 
the need for further research on those issues that have not 
yet been sufficiently explored. This policy brief summarises 
the main points raised during the discussion, and it seeks to 
stimulate further debate.
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Recent developments in relation to the 
assessment of horizontal and vertical 
agreements in online markets
The first session of the event dealt with the assessment 
of horizontal and vertical agreements in online 
markets. Within this framework, the payment card 
market represents one of the most prominent and 
interesting examples. Participants thus shed light 
on the fact that the payment card market’s network 
rules and pricing mechanisms have been subject to 
several Commission’s investigations. In 2002, the 
European Commission granted an exemption for 
VISA’s multilateral intra-European cross border 
interchange fees (‘MIFs’), after the Bank card 
association made major changes to its own system. 
In particular, Visa reduced the level of its MIFs; 
it also capped them at the level of relevant costs, 
significantly improving the situation for retailers 
and, ultimately, for the consumer. Furthermore, 
in 2007, the Commission adopted a decision 
prohibiting MasterCard’s MIFs for cross-border 
card payments between Member States of the EEA.1 
Within this framework, EU Regulation 2015/7512 
was adopted with a view to further encouraging 
competition and the integration of the European 
market for payment cards, in particular, through the 
avoidance of unreasonably high interchange fees and 
the imposition of transparency obligations on banks 
and retailers. 
Participants also noted that preventing geo-blocking 
practices and other forms of discrimination against 
consumers, on the grounds of their place of residence 
or nationality, is at the heart of the actions that the 
European Commission is currently undertaking 
1. Decision C (2007) 6474 final was adopted by the Commis-
sion on 19 December 2007. It was found that from 22 May, 
1992, to 19 December 2007, MasterCard’s intra-EEA MIFs 
infringed Article 81(1) TEC, (now 101(1) TFEU). 
2. Regulation (EU) 2015/751 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 29th April, 2015, on interchange fees 
for card-based payment transactions.
to protect cross-border sales in the Digital Single 
Market (‘DSM’). The draft Geo-blocking Regulation 
aims to ensure that consumers seeking to buy 
products and services in another EU country (be 
it online or in person) are not treated differently, 
unless this is objectively justified for reasons such 
as VAT or certain public interest legal provisions. 
Similarly, with reference to trade in services, Article 
20(2) of the Services Directive 2006/123/EC requires 
Member States to ensure that companies do not apply 
higher prices or deny access to trade recipients, and 
especially consumers, in the DSM. 
Reflecting upon the interplay between competition 
and regulation, the discussion confirmed that EU 
competition law is also perfectly able to deal with 
certain restrictions in an effective way. The Pierre 
Fabre case, which recognises the freedom of retailers 
to have an on-line presence, represents a landmark 
ruling in the context of e-commerce in the EU.3 In 
this judgement, the French Competition Authority 
deemed that selective distribution contracts, 
stipulating that sales must be made exclusively in a 
physical space, are contrary to both French and EU 
competition law. The decision was challenged before 
the Court of Appeal of Paris and was referred to the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’), 
which finally held that the exclusion of the Internet 
as a distribution channel influences the competitive 
position of the purchaser and, simultaneously, 
affects consumers, by restricting their choice of the 
products available to purchase online. A general 
and absolute ban on internet sales contained in a 
selective distribution agreement therefore constitutes 
a restriction of competition by ‘object’, within the 
meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU.4 
3. ECJ, Case C-439/09 of 13 October 2011, Pierre Fabre Der-
mo-Cosmétique vs. President of the Autorité de la Concur-
rence.
4. Furthermore, the Court held that the selective distribu-
tion agreements containing such a ban could not benefit 
from the provisions of the Vertical Restraints Block Ex-
emption Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 
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Participants then focused on the analysis of some of 
the trends that have emerged following this decision, 
clarifying that the most typical vertical restraints in 
the Internet retail market have so far included: (i) 
across-platforms parity agreements (APPAs), i.e., a 
special form of a most-favoured customer clause; (ii) 
price-related restrictions (e.g., dual pricing systems); 
and (iii) non-price related restrictions (e.g., platform 
bans). Participants stated that the analysis of the 
impact of vertical restraints on the realisation of the 
potential benefits that are associated with online 
markets is key. 
Furthermore, moving from the assumption that the 
newest developments in the economy are caused by 
the expansion of the Internet have changed the type 
of concerns that may arise in the market, participants 
agreed that NCAs are called upon to fine-tune their 
approach in order to be effective enforcers of EU 
competition law. On the other hand, the need to 
ensure that both businesses and consumers can 
rely on a consistent application of competition rules 
made participants emphasise the importance of the 
role played by the ECN in this context. This does not 
necessarily entail aligning all of the NCAs’ actions; 
what really matters is the presence of a forum where 
enforcement projects can be discussed, and in which 
a constant flow of dialogue can be guaranteed for 
consistency purposes. 
Another strand of the debate dealt with the diversity 
and fast-changing nature of platform ecosystems in 
the digital economy. First, it was pointed out that 
online platforms have revolutionised the access to, 
and provision of, both information and services, 
and that the vast majority of them originate from 
the US. Although it is difficult to agree on a single 
definition5, there are certainly common features 
of 16 December 2002, on the implementation of the rules 
on competition that are laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of 
the Treaty).
5. As an example, see the definition proposed by the German 
Bundeskartellamt Paper on the Digital Economy (2015), 
that they share, such as the ability to extract and 
create digital value from users’ transactions and 
interactions; the capacity to create and shape new 
markets, while disrupting the traditional ones; and 
the strong relationship between the increase in the 
value of the services they offer with the number of 
their users.6 Second, it was pondered whether an 
online platform can act as a facilitator of collusion, 
in light of the most relevant case law. An important 
decision rendered by the CJEU has recently clarified 
the boundaries of the notion of concerted practice 
when it comes to technology markets.7 For instance, 
in the Eturas case, the participation of an undertaking 
in an arrangement could not be inferred from the 
mere dispatching of an anticompetitive message, as 
this is not sufficient to trigger the presumption of 
awareness. The main lesson learned from the case 
is that competitors sharing some IT functions with 
each other, as normally happens when relying on 
a common platform, should closely monitor the 
operations carried out and consider the appropriate 
reaction to be undertaken in order to avoid antitrust 
liabilities. Similarly, US case law seems to suggest 
that the creators of online platforms may be forced to 
take antitrust legal implications into consideration 
in the future, if they want to rely on a robust 
business model that is capable of withstanding 
according to which platforms are “undertakings that, in 
the role of an intermediary, enable direct interaction be-
tween two or more sides of users, between which there are 
indirect network effects”.
6. See Communication from the Commission to the Euro-
pean Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 
Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market, Oppor-
tunities and Challenges for Europe, COM(2016) 288 final, 
Brussels, 25.5.2016.
7. The Eturas case originates in a decision of the Lithuanian 
Competition Council, which fined an online travel book-
ing system for coordinating the discounts applicable to 
clients among 30 travel agencies in the country. The deci-
sion was appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court 
and was referred to the ECJ. See C-74/14 UAB Eturas and 
Others v Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos taryba.
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the competition watchdogs’ scrutiny. In v. Meyer 
Kalanick, Uber drivers allegedly agreed to participate 
in a conspiracy among themselves, giving rise to a 
horizontal price-fixing arrangement, by accepting 
the terms and conditions of the technology company. 
Although the case is still pending, it is likely to have 
a huge impact that will not be limited to the US only. 
If the application commonly used on smartphone 
devices is found to contravene antitrust law, it might 
undergo a strict process of revision involving the 
main features of its fare algorithm. 
Merger trends in innovation markets on 
both sides of the Atlantic
The debate was enriched by an overview of the latest 
developments that had been recorded in the field of 
merger control, at the EU level. It was argued that the 
international dimension is becoming increasingly 
important in the matter of merger control. In fact, 
between 2014 and 2015, the European Commission 
had to cooperate with the US authorities in more 
than 70% of its merger cases.8 There was consensus 
among participants that only 10 years ago this would 
not ever have been predicted. The trend certainly 
reflects the increasing convergence of the two 
antitrust models towards a new global framework 
that requires coordinated enforcement actions. With 
a view to refining the current merger control system, 
the 2014 White Paper has identified potential areas 
of reform and has proposed a set of options to foster 
simplification, so that those transactions that are 
unlikely to harm competition can go through even 
more quickly and simply than they currently do. In 
the digital era, it also seems important to investigate 
whether the current thresholds, which are based on 
turnover, are still perfectly able to capture all the 
cases that would need to be examined. In 2014, for 
instance, Facebook paid 19 billion dollars to buy 
8. Notably, the percentage of cases recording institutional 
cooperation with other jurisdictions is much lower: e.g., 
Brazil as for Latin America (12%), and China (8%).
WhatsApp, a company with 600 million customers. 
A substantial proportion of those users were in 
Europe. Yet the merger did not have to be notified to 
the Commission, because WhatsApp’s turnover was 
not high enough to meet the European thresholds. 
All these aspects require careful thought and they 
have already encouraged an interesting debate in 
Europe among NCAs.
Next, it was submitted that the Commission has 
intensified the scrutiny of the potential loss of 
innovation in its merger reviews. In this respect, 
the EU and US authorities have already emphasised 
the contribution of merger control enforcement 
to the promotion of innovation. At the same time, 
the challenges associated with the rapid growth of 
intellectual property-intensive industries is certainly 
stimulating a debate that questions the effectiveness 
of the most traditional tools of antitrust analysis 
everywhere. If, generally speaking, innovation may 
suffer from a strict application of merger control 
rules, it was also recognised that when it comes to 
disruptive innovation, the NCAs’ role become even 
more delicate. In this case, authorities are called 
upon to determine whether the acquired firm is a 
potential disruptor; and whether the transaction 
has the potential to slow down innovation. In 
both jurisdictions, the respective Guidelines invite 
NCAs to be particularly cautious in authorising the 
acquisition of a “maverick” firm.9 
Participants then debated whether innovation 
could be deemed to be a relevant parameter of 
competition, alongside price, output or quality. In 
the case of the merger control policy, this would 
entail that reduction or elimination of competitive 
pressure should be presumed to harm innovation. It 
was stated that there seems to be a consensus on this 
point, both in the EU and in the US. 
On the other hand, post-Schumpeterian theories 
that assume that innovation increases with the firm’s 
9. See US 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines and EU 2004 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
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size and market concentration, make this point 
highly controversial.10 However, the mixed results 
drawn from more recent empirical studies suggest 
that there are some methodological problems that 
are associated with the use of proxy variables for 
innovation that reduce the significance of any 
hypothesis of this type.11 
Participants agreed on the fact that competition law 
not only applies to existing product markets, but 
also to rivalry in the development of new products. 
Mergers justifying intervention would thus be those 
between an existing competitor and a firm developing 
a new product, and a fortiori, those between the 
two only firms developing a new product. This is 
particularly relevant for sectors where the poles of 
R&D can be easily identified. 
Nevertheless, the peculiar competition dynamics 
of each industry suggest that building a general 
conceptual framework is not an easy task.12 In 2004, 
the US Federal Trade Commission gave a green light 
on Genzyme’s acquisition of Novazyme, the only 
two pharmaceutical companies working on finding 
a preclinical treatment for a rare life-threatening 
10. In particular, in the US, some commentators have ad-
vanced the idea that a reduction in competitive pressure 
cannot be presumed to harm innovation. See Pablo Ibáñez 
Colomo, Restrictions on Innovation in EU Competition 
Law, LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 
22/2015. The counter-argument is based on the finding of 
Arrow (1962), and this has been generalised as stating that 
a competitive environment spurs innovation. 
11. Cohen and Levin (1989); Scherer (1980); Bound, Cum-
mins et al. (1984); and Cremer and Sirbu (1978).
12. As for the pharmaceuticals sector, a recent strand of re-
search that analysed 65 pharma mergers were all scru-
tinised, but were eventually approved by the European 
Commission, shows that R&D and patents within the 
merged entity decline substantially after the completion 
of the transaction. On average, patenting and R&D ex-
penditures of non-merging competitors also fall by at least 
20% in the 4 years following a merger. Justus Haucap and 
Joel Stibale, How Mergers Affect Innovation: Theory and 
Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry, Düsseldorf 
Institute for Competition Economics, 218/2016.
medical condition that affects infants and young 
children. The FTC’s investigation focused on the 
transaction’s potential impact on the pace and 
scope of research into the development of the new 
treatment, concluding that “there is no reason to 
believe, a priori, that a particular merger is more likely 
to harm innovation than to help it”.13 It was finally 
submitted that the application of competition law to 
such instances seems less controversial than in the 
past, given some recent pharmaceuticals and medical 
devices cases that witness that the same approach to 
innovation markets has been undertaken in both the 
EU and the US.14 
Participants thus highlighted the fact that 
different concerns are associated with vertical 
and conglomerate mergers, an area where there is 
probably greater divergence between the two sides 
of the Atlantic. In fact, in these cases, the European 
Commission took into careful consideration the risk 
that merged entities could reduce the ability of other 
competitors to innovate. In the Intel and McAfee 
merger, whereas the FTC did not raise any concern 
about the transaction, the European Commission 
enforced a behavioural remedy to prevent Intel from 
foreclosing the market to other potential innovative 
companies offering anti-virus software.15
It was concluded that merger analysis from an 
innovation market perspective should aim to identify 
three key effects: (i) investigating if the merger has the 
ability to reduce total market investments in R&D; 
(ii) assessing if the merged firms have the incentive 
to reduce the innovative effort; (iii) determining if 
the merger may have an impact on efficiency and 
R&D expenditures.
13. Statement issued by the FTC Chairman, Timothy J. Muris. 
14. For instance, in 2015, the European Commission ap-
proved both GSK’s acquisition of Novartis’ vaccines busi-
ness and a consumer healthcare joint venture between the 
two undertakings, which was subject to conditions. 
15. OECD, The Impact of disruptive innovations on competi-
tion law enforcement, 2015.
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Antitrust enforcement in innovation 
industries on both sides of the Atlantic
The second half-day conference focused on two 
major topics. On the one hand, the attention was 
drawn to antitrust enforcement in the innovation 
industries, and speakers looked closely at standard 
essential patents (SEPs) and at the main competition 
challenges in the search markets. On the other hand, 
discussions concentrated on private enforcement, 
and its role and efficacy in the United States and the 
European Union, respectively. 
Technological developments are one of the main 
factors that have triggered the boom in digital 
markets. In fact, the innovation industries are 
leading the digital revolution. In this scenario, SEPs 
have often played a fundamental role. 
As a background, it was noted that the digital 
innovation industries have a number of characteristics 
that make them unique. Just to mention a few, they 
usually operate in multi-sided markets, where the 
definition of market power can be challenging, and 
also the geographic scope of the market may be 
difficult to identify; innovation plays an important 
role in this environment, and may contribute to the 
blurring of market boundaries. In addition, networks 
effects are amplified; if, on the one hand, this often 
leads to an improvement in the quality of services 
and enlarges the sources of revenue, on the other 
hand, it facilitates the establishment of dominance, 
and thus watchdogs have to be particularly careful. 
Moreover, a number of services are offered free, and 
price discrimination may be favoured by techniques 
like geo-blocking. Furthermore, digital innovation 
markets are highly dynamic; subject to rapid change 
and evolution, and therefore enforcers often have 
difficulty in intervening in a timely fashion. Another 
element concerns the impact of free services on 
the data flow, both in terms of the gathering and 
the processing of data. In order to guarantee data 
protection and privacy, a case-by-case analysis was 
suggested as being the best option. 
From a purely antitrust perspective, it was indicated 
that three types of challenges commonly occur in the 
digital innovation markets: (i) those related to the 
increased use of vertical restraints in e-commerce, 
(ii) those linked to potentially exclusionary conduct, 
and (iii) those concerning IP rights.
As for the first, a focus can be put on resale price 
maintenance (RPM) clauses. While, in certain cases, 
the efficiencies deriving from these clauses may not 
be easy to identify, on the contrary, such clauses can 
facilitate collusion. Currently, the approach to RPM 
in the EU and in the US differs significantly, as, in the 
former, such restrictions are considered hard-core, 
while, in the latter, they are treated under the rule of 
reason scheme. One can wonder if this diversity is 
sustainable or productive in digital markets, which 
have no clear geographical borders. 
Concerning exclusionary conducts, one of the main 
issues relates to the burden of proof, and how to 
distribute it among competition authorities and 
market players. In any case, it was underlined that 
the majority of the emerging exclusionary issues in 
the innovation industries appear to be linked to big 
data, which clearly constitute an immense source of 
innovation, but which can, nonetheless, create some 
concerns from an antitrust perspective, and not 
only from that. Cases of exclusionary conduct occur 
frequently, but may not be easy to address. In fact, 
sometimes remedies are simple to set up, but others 
they can be extremely complex as, for example, 
when an intervention is needed to the algorithm, 
which could be the basis of the company’s business 
model. Considering how invasive the remedy may 
be in those circumstances, it becomes even more 
important to look carefully at the conduct (i.e., the 
functioning of the algorithm) to assess whether there 
is an economic justification behind it, or if collusion 
or exclusion is its main scope. 
There was consensus among participants on the 
fact that self-learning machines, including, but not 
limited to, algorithms, raise the biggest challenges 
for antitrust enforcement. In fact, they no longer 
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act as longa manus of the programmer, but, on 
their own, can come to a cartel-like outcome while 
setting prices, and this is usually helped by the 
wide transparency of the market. In this scenario, 
retaliation mechanisms are also easier to set and to 
implement. 
As for exploitative abuses in digital markets, it 
was noted that, again, the approaches in the EU 
and US diverge. In fact, in the US, the attention is 
concentrated on potential damages for final users, 
which may be rare in cases of exploitation, while 
often, in the EU, the impact on the competitive 
dynamics in the market is also taken into account. 
Narrowing down the attention to SEPs, one of the 
major points of discussion is the so-called “hold-up” 
theory. More specifically, this theory focuses on the 
concern that SEP holders may seek to take advantage 
of the related market power to exclude competition 
or to obtain unjustifiably higher rents. 
There are major concerns with this theory, for 
example that  market power cannot be presumed. 
Moreover, many elements that are related to the 
dynamic of standardisation should be taken into 
due account. For example, in the case of complex 
standards, the research and development of 
technologies contributed to the standardisation 
process is costly and uncertain; the selection of 
technologies is made based on performance and 
efficiency, which is lengthy process; yet the great 
percentage of participants to standardisation do not 
make technology contributions to standardisation, 
yet review and vote on the  acceptance of that 
technology, that may be deemed essential to 
the resulting standard. In addition, technology 
developers sustain the high costs and uncertainties 
of developing and contributing technologies, with 
additional uncertainty about the outcome of the 
standardisation process and the dissemination of 
standardised technologies, affecting returns on 
investments. 
Concerning more specifically the issue of the 
availability of injunctions for infringement of SEPs 
under the current system, SEP holders who seek 
injunctive relief bear burden of demonstrating that 
they deserve such a remedy. However, convincing 
a court that an injunction is warranted this is not a 
simple task. The role of antitrust regulation should 
be seen in this context.
In comparing the EU and US approaches, it was noted 
that there are a number of meaningful differences. 
For example, Article 102 TFEU expressly contains 
excessive pricing provisions, while the Clayton Act 
does not and Section 5 of the FTC Act remains 
controversial. As a result US policy has tended to 
evolve more through ‘soft law’ mechanisms, such as 
mergers review remedies. The significant use of ‘soft 
law’ instruments in this area might not create the 
legal certainty needed for both patent holders and 
implementers about their obligations.
The discussions then focused on the analysis of 
the most recent case law, and in particular on the 
Samsung and Motorola decisions of the European 
Commission and the Huawei v ZTE case of the 
European Court of Justice . It was highlighted that 
there have been differences in the way a number of 
issues have been approached, including the theory 
of harm, the burden of proof, the definition of the 
‘willing licensee’ test, the balance of rights and, more 
ultimately the role of antitrust in disputes over what 
the ‘right’ royalty level should be. 
It was noted that a number of questions related to 
the interplay between essential patents and antitrust 
remain, at least partially, open. By way of example, 
it is still unclear which is the standard of risk 
related to SEPs hold-up that should trigger antitrust 
enforcement. Moreover, there are doubts on the fact 
that antitrust is suited to address claims of “excessive” 
royalties absent objectively established exclusionary 
conduct. 
To conclude on this topic, a more cautious common 
approach appeared to be evolving that considered 
the risks to innovation of excessive reliance on 
7 ■  Emerging Trends in US Antitrust and EU Competition Law - ENTraNCE Annual Conference
preconceived notions and of theoretical competitive 
harm as well as the potential inefficiencies of specific 
rules-based IPRs policies that may be more related 
to the patent system than the antitrust system. There 
was consensus also on the need for an increased 
understanding of SEPs dynamics, which will help 
to ensure the appropriate balance between the 
protection of IP rights and other interests involved. 
Discussions then focused on the competition 
challenges that are related to the search markets. 
Search is particularly important because of its impact 
on many other services and businesses. By way of 
example, the mobile apps market is underpinned by 
search: the way users usually discover a service is to 
search, while the app comes afterwards. 
As is known, the major legal case relating to 
searching concerns the investigations of Google. 
There, a number of criticalities were debated. First, 
it was noted that the timing of the enforcement is 
excessively long, and this is to the detriment of both 
interested parties’ rights and the legal certainty in 
the market. Second, doubts were cast on the fact that 
the relevant behaviours are not avoidable, because 
there is no other effective way to programme 
the algorithm. Other delicate issues concern the 
exclusionary potential of data collection, which can 
reinforce market power, build barriers to entry, and 
make switching more difficult, or even impossible, 
for final users. 
It was underlined that, here again, there is a need for 
deeper research and reflections on the likely theory 
of harm. On the one hand, the right link between the 
extra-profit and the users’ damage should be clearly 
spelled out. On the other hand, the efficiencies that 
are related to the relevant behaviours should also be 
carefully assessed, and to properly do so, it appears 
to be important to increase the understanding of the 
engineering behind the algorithm, its limits and its 
potential. 
It was noted that the European Commission is 
moving slowly in this field, which, in any case, 
appears to be a priority for many antitrust authorities 
around the world (among others, the FTC, the 
Brazilian authority, and the Korean one). It was 
argued that, this being the scenario, the European 
Commission could take the lead, but, in order to 
do so, it should be able to carefully define what the 
specific harm that consumers suffer is, and why it is 
so in that particular case. That said, transparency and 
cooperation mechanisms could be extremely useful 
for competition authorities, if they want to be able 
to coordinate their responses to similar behaviours.
During the debate that followed the panel, the issue 
of technology mandates was tackled. It was recalled 
that a mandate may have different meanings in 
different contexts. Concerning SEPs, the European 
Commission appears to mandate the process, not 
the result. However, questions were raised on the 
risks that are related to this approach, especially in 
terms of its impact on the technological neutrality 
principle.
Moreover, it was argued that, considering that 
monetising a patent is the common way to obtain 
a return on investments, if regulation makes it too 
difficult to perform this, companies may be tempted 
to let someone else do it for them, in other words, to 
adopt a wait and see approach. In this scenario, patent 
aggregators could become even more attractive. In 
any case, it was highlighted that patent law has a role 
that should not to be forgotten, and it should be duly 
applied when it is necessary. 
Part of the debate concerned the helpfulness of 
soft law. If, on the one hand, some sustained that 
guidelines, best practices and similar tools could 
constitute a precious instrument for agencies, on the 
other hand, some noted that, at least on key issues, 
in order to ensure legal certainty it is important to 
have courts that can decide. Alternatively, national 
competition authorities should be able to issue non-
infringement decisions, or to declare that the issue 
raised does not concern antitrust law, but, rather, 
relates to other fields of law. In the US, this approach 
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was taken in the Trinko decision16, but in the EU 
there appears to be no similar precedent. 
Private Enforcement in the EU and US in 
the aftermath of the EU Damages Directive
The second panel of Saturday morning dealt with 
the private enforcement of antitrust rules. The scene 
was set starting from the major reason that lies 
behind private actions, i.e., victims’ compensation. 
In addition, private enforcement is considered to be 
an additional tool in terms of deterrence, as it creates 
incentives for the law not to be violated. Finally, it 
can also constitute a mechanism to supplement 
public enforcement if the latter is underutilised 
for whatever reason. Notwithstanding private 
enforcement’s potentials, the European Institutions 
needed many years to issue the Damages Directive, 
and one might wonder why this was the case. 
In considering the United States, there are a number 
of elements that characterise its regime: mandatory 
treble damages, class actions, fee recovery (although 
with an asymmetry: if the defendant wins, s/he will 
receive more satisfaction, but will not recover the 
fee), jury trials (with the annexed peculiarities that 
are related to the jury’s composition), discovery 
rights, to mention just a few. In addition, it is not 
possible to access leniency documents, although, 
after the reform of the year 2000, the first leniency 
applicants that cooperate with private actors can 
avoid treble damages, which become single ones. 
It was noted that the major consequence of this 
system is perhaps the change in the role of public 
authorities in the US. In fact, private actions have 
gained an impressive power to decide which theories 
of harm deserve more attention, thus, somehow. 
they act as gatekeepers. In other words, private 
enforcement takes away the agenda-setting from the 
16. The Supreme Court of the United States, case Verizon 
Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP, 
540 U.S. 398 (2004).
public enforcers. In reaction, what the US authorities 
are doing is to increase their role as amicus curiae. 
The second mentioned consequence was deterrence. 
Class actions constitute a very powerful tool to 
dissuade people/companies from committing 
infringements. To recur to some data, in the past 
few  years, private recovery has been granted over 
3 billion dollars, while, in the same period, public 
sanctions amounted to only about 1 billion dollars. 
Moreover, usually, private actions stress the theory 
of harm, while public ones often end in a negotiated 
solutions. 
Having set this scene, it was noted that currently, in 
the US, there is a fierce debate on whether the private 
enforcement system can lead to over-deterrence. It 
was noted that, so far, there is no convincing study 
that demonstrates this thesis; nevertheless, the 
US authorities seem to endorse it. The role of the 
Congress was mentioned, and it was reported that 
some believe that the latter has a major influence 
on the change of doctrine and in the definition 
of what harm means, and this is supposedly so 
because the Congress deliberately told the courts to 
provide details about the theory of harm in specific 
cases, and it gave instructions on how to adjust it. 
As for the academic scenario, the modern Harvard 
School, which appears to be very institutional in its 
approach, supports the argument of over deterrence, 
and it sustains that imposing treble damages is as 
negative as imposing criminal imprisonment. It 
was recalled, on the other hand, that the last case 
of public enforcement before a US court dates back 
to the 1970s. Since then, no public authority has 
gone before a court to articulate a theory of harm in 
relation to monopolisation. 
Irrespective of the approach taken concerning the 
specific arguments that are mentioned above, there 
appears to be a consensus on the fact that as long as 
US companies remain afraid of the courts’ reactions 
in private actions, this will over deter, and will make 
the convergence between the US and the EU systems 
more difficult to achieve. 
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Bearing in mind the US experience, the audience 
wondered whether, in the European Union, judges 
will be convinced that private damages play an 
important role, or whether they will be more careful 
and hesitant in order to avoid the system going out 
of control. 
As the debate went on, the axis was moved to the 
EU Damages Directive, and its major features were 
analysed and discussed. First, it was recalled that it 
has two main aims: to ensure full compensation and 
to guarantee the parallel development of private and 
public enforcement. It was noted that this second 
aim is particularly evident in the provisions that 
deal with the protection of leniency documents. 
In addition, the Directive acts as a game changer, 
because it establishes, and disciplines in detail, the 
right of disclosure and the access to information, 
using black lists and grey lists. 
Among the other specific provisions that were 
debated during the session, it is worth mentioning 
those concerning interests, which could play an 
important role especially in the case of prolonged 
infringements, the dispositions in case of umbrella 
damages, or those that relate to the territorial scope 
of infringement, as challenges are raised where such 
scope goes beyond the national, or even the EU’s, 
borders. 
It was also noted that another key provision allows 
co-cartelists to be sued in one proceeding before one 
competent court. As a consequence, the decision 
about where to bring the case becomes strategic. 
Other elements which may impact on such a 
decision are the costs associated with the litigation, 
the private international law regime that is applied 
by each Member State, as it will be the one deciding 
the applicable law and solving possible conflicts of 
laws. 
All in all, it was argued that the Directive calls for 
a step change in the enforcement of competition 
rules; it impacts on a scenario of unbalance between 
public and private enforcement, trying to find a new 
equilibrium and to solve the gap between zero- and 
full-compensation. In order to do so, the European 
Institutions have concentrated on private actions’ 
major obstacles, i.e., mainly, procedural issues, as 
well as cultural legacy. From this perspective, the 
Directive constitutes a global cultural effort, not just 
a legal issue.
On this path, a fundamental role is also played by the 
guidelines on the quantification of damages, which 
are especially important for their harmonisation 
effect, rather than for the specific content itself. In 
fact, through them, the European Commission 
provides national courts with guidance on how 
to estimate damages and this contributes to the 
overtaking of the traditional reluctance of European 
judges to hear antitrust cases.
While the implementation process is going ahead, 
it remains to be seen how national courts adapt to 
the new rules. A number of elements that could 
be of help in this transition phase were identified 
during the final discussion. One of them is a more 
interventionist attitude from the competition 
authorities. This could take the form of acting as 
amicus curiae and providing support to national 
judges, but it could also be implemented by providing 
more data and more detail in the authorities’ 
decisions, especially in the current context, where 
settlement decisions are very common, but they are 
extremely vague, and often do not contain enough 
information on the infringement. It was noted that 
this scenario makes it difficult for all, not only the 
courts, to investigate cartels and the theory of harm 
behind them if judgments and decisions do not 
provide details on their functioning. 
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